Federal Judge Dismisses Challenge to Connecticut Marijuana Social-Equity Licensing Law, but Leaves Door Open for Revised Lawsuit

A federal judge has dismissed a constitutional challenge to Connecticut’s marijuana social-equity licensing system, while giving the plaintiff another opportunity to revise his lawsuit and continue the case.

U.S. District Judge Vernon D. Oliver issued the ruling Tuesday in Smith v. Lamont, a lawsuit filed by longtime Connecticut resident and hemp farmer Brant Smith against Gov. Ned Lamont, Attorney General William Tong and Department of Consumer Protection Commissioner Bryan Cafferelli.

Smith has sought a license to cultivate marijuana but has been unable to obtain one. His lawsuit argues that Connecticut’s preference for social-equity applicants under the Responsible and Equitable Regulation of Adult-Use Cannabis Act violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution by improperly favoring certain in-state economic interests.

Oliver did not decide whether Connecticut’s licensing system is constitutional. Instead, he concluded that Smith’s existing complaint does not sufficiently establish that he has standing to bring the challenge.

Under Connecticut law, a social-equity applicant generally must be at least 65% owned and controlled by individuals who meet income requirements and have lived for a specified period in an area disproportionately affected by marijuana prohibition. The state provides special licensing opportunities for qualifying social-equity applicants, including a pathway for cultivator licenses.

Smith alleged that he is not a “Social Equity Individual” and that the system has prevented him from obtaining a cultivation license.

The judge, however, said the complaint does not explain why Smith does not qualify for social-equity status, whether he actually applied for and was denied a cultivation license, or whether the Social Equity Council formally determined that he did not qualify.

That distinction was central to the ruling because Smith must show that his alleged injury is connected to discrimination against interstate commerce in order to have standing for his dormant Commerce Clause claim.

“Plaintiff’s only allegation is that he is not a ‘Social Equity Individual,’” Oliver wrote. The complaint does not specify whether Smith fails to qualify because of Connecticut’s income requirement, residency criteria or another reason.

The dismissal was **without prejudice**, meaning Smith can attempt to correct those deficiencies rather than having his constitutional challenge permanently rejected.

Oliver gave Smith until **October 21** to file an amended complaint. If he does not do so, the court said the case will be dismissed and closed.

The ruling also highlights a growing disagreement among federal appeals courts over whether the dormant Commerce Clause applies to state marijuana markets at all while marijuana remains federally prohibited.

In 2025, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, whose decisions govern federal courts in Connecticut, held in *Variscite NY Four v. New York State Cannabis Control Board* that dormant Commerce Clause protections apply even though marijuana remains federally illegal.

The Ninth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion earlier this year in litigation involving marijuana licensing systems in Washington and Sacramento, ruling that the dormant Commerce Clause does not protect interstate commerce in a market prohibited by federal law.

Oliver acknowledged the split but said the Connecticut federal court is bound by the Second Circuit.

“The Second Circuit has been exceptionally clear in holding that the dormant Commerce Clause applies to federally illegal markets,” Oliver wrote, adding that the court “will not depart from the Second Circuit’s binding precedent.”

That means Connecticut did not secure a ruling that its marijuana social-equity licensing provisions are immune from a dormant Commerce Clause challenge. Instead, whether Smith can obtain a decision on the underlying constitutionality of the system will depend first on whether an amended complaint establishes that he has standing to pursue the case.